AI coding assistants such as GPT-5.1, Gemini 3, Claude 4.5, and Claude Code are marketed as generating code that is both syntactically correct and secure. Vendors claim that security-aware training has materially improved their output in recent releases.
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Expert: Veracode, Application Security Testing (Spring 2026 GenAI Code Security report) Veracode's Spring 2026 GenAI Code Security testing contradicts those claims. Across hundreds of coding tasks in Java, Python, C#, and JavaScript, the AI coding assistants tested - including GPT-5.1/5.2, Gemini 3, and Claude 4.5/4.6 - achieved syntax correctness rates exceeding 95%, but their security pass rate remains stuck at approximately 55%, virtually identical to where it stood two years ago. The models 'still can't write secure code' at acceptable rates, according to Veracode, despite the rapid improvement in raw code generation quality and repeated vendor claims that security has kept pace. The finding is notable because it shows that newer, larger models have not moved the security needle: the security pass rate has not improved across multiple testing cycles even after major releases. For developers and organizations relying on AI-assisted coding, the practical implication is that syntax-level competence does not translate into security competence - AI-generated code still needs the same security review, testing, and tooling as human-written code, and treating 'it compiles' as 'it is safe' is a costly mistake. Source: https://www.veracode.com/blog/spring-2026-genai-code-security/
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