LLM Explanations Mislead Non Experts Skin Disease Diagnosis
I read about explainable medical AI, promoted on the promise that a plain-language explanation tells users when to trust a diagnosis. In a controlled skin-disease study, the large language model explanations did the opposite for the people who relied on them most: non-experts trusted LLM explanations whether they were right or wrong, were measurably more confident in their wrong answers when an LLM explanation was attached, and rated explanations as more convincing when they were vague or generic. Non-expert accuracy rose mainly because users deferred to the model, and that deference hurt more when the model was wrong than it helped when the model was right. Clinicians, by contrast, were not tripped up by incorrect AI explanations and did best with a bare prediction and no explanation at all. Is that right?
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Expert: Marzyeh Ghassemi, Orson Xu and Roxana Daneshjou, MIT EECS associate professor; Columbia assistant professor of biomedical informatics (lead author); Stanford assistant professor of biomedical data science and dermatology The study, published in Nature Medicine on 4 August 2026, tested two very different groups against several styles of explainable AI: members of the public deciding whether an image of a skin mole was cancerous, and primary care providers producing a full differential diagnosis. The explanations included a bare prediction with a confidence level, similar-image retrieval, a heat map, and an LLM that explains the model's reasoning in plain language. The LLM explanation was the method that changed user behaviour most - for the worse. The headline failure is what happened when the model was wrong. Non-expert accuracy did improve with explainable AI, but the researchers attribute that mainly to deference, not understanding: users were better largely because the tools helped them clear benign moles, and they still followed the AI on the cases where it erred. Marzyeh Ghassemi (MIT): "But the reason non-expert users are better is because they are more reliant on the models. When the model is wrong, it hurts performance more than it helps performance when the model is right." Confidence moved in the wrong direction too. Users were more confident about wrong answers when aided by an LLM explanation, and they judged explanations to be more convincing when those explanations were vague or generic - the opposite of what explainability is supposed to deliver. Roxana Daneshjou (Stanford): "Our findings show that those with the least medical knowledge are most likely to be led astray when explainable AI models give an erroneous output." Clinicians showed the inverse pattern. They were resilient to incorrect AI explanations and, of all the explainability methods tested, an LLM boosted their accuracy the least. Orson Xu (Columbia), the lead author, explains the asymmetry: "A clinician already has a diagnosis in mind and checks the AI against their own training, so a bad explanation gets caught. Meanwhile, a non-expert can use that exact same explanation to form an opinion in the first place, so a plausible, confident-sounding rationale can pull them toward the wrong answer. The same tool ends up being an asset for one user and a liability for another." The paper also identifies when deference is manufactured rather than earned: if an explanation is shown before the user commits to their own diagnosis, users become more deferential to the model. The authors' suggested fix is process design rather than better prose - require users to state a hypothesis first, then present the AI suggestion as a set of additional conditions to consider, instead of generating ever more detailed LLM rationales. Ghassemi's framing of the design rule: "Good AI systems can improve performance in some health settings, but this has to be balanced carefully with algorithmic deference that can lead to more error. We know that both AI and explainability methods can engage automation bias in humans, and this anchoring effect is something that must be accounted for when we design AI systems." The study did find a genuine win for careful design: a fairness-constrained model aimed at skin-tone bias significantly improved accuracy and reduced diagnostic disparities based on skin tone. The general lesson stands - a convincing explanation is not evidence that the prediction behind it is correct, and for users without domain knowledge it is often read as exactly that. Senior authorship and paper details: Ghassemi (MIT EECS, Institute for Medical Engineering and Science, Jameel Clinic), Xu (Columbia, Biomedical Informatics) and Daneshjou (Stanford) with Haoran Zhang, Reina Wang and Luis Soenksen, Nature Medicine, DOI 10.1038/s41591-026-04553-w. Funded in part by the National Science Foundation, Schmidt Sciences, the National Bureau of Economic Research, and Columbia University. Source: https://news.mit.edu/2026/medical-ai-assistance-benefits-vary-based-on-user-expertise-0804
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