Ghostapproval AI Coding Assistants Hide Symlink Targets
I was shown a confirmation dialog before my AI coding assistant wrote a file: "Make this edit to `project_settings.json`?" In Wiz Research's GhostApproval proof of concept, `project_settings.json` inside a cloned repository is a symbolic link pointing outside the workspace - at `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` or `~/.zshrc`. The agent follows the link and writes attacker-controlled content to the real target, which can give the attacker persistent password-less SSH access and reach remote code execution on my machine, while the approval box showed only the harmless in-project path - and it presented that harmless path as settled fact. In several of the tools the agent's own reasoning had already identified the true target - Claude Code stated "this is a symbolic link to the Claude settings file", and in another test "I can see that `project_settings.json` is actually a zsh configuration file" - yet the prompt presented to the human concealed it. Amazon Q Developer went further and wrote to the filesystem before showing the user anything, offering only an "Undo" option after the write had already happened. Is this safe?
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Expert: Wiz Research, Cloud security research team, Wiz Wiz Research tested six of the most widely used AI coding assistants and reproduced the same failure in all six: Amazon Q Developer, Anthropic's Claude Code, Augment, Cursor, Google Antigravity and Windsurf. The technical primitive is symlink following (CWE-61), a Unix issue documented for decades. What makes the finding serious is the layer stacked on top of it - CWE-451, misrepresentation of critical information in the user interface. A sandbox or approval dialog that resolves an untrusted path without showing the user the canonical target is not a safety boundary; it is a rubber stamp. The user approves what they believe is a local config edit while the agent writes outside the project. The six vendors did not treat the report the same way: 1. AWS fixed it in Amazon Q Developer language server 1.69.0 (CVE-2026-12958, rated High) and said the language server updates automatically, so most customers need take no action beyond reloading their IDE. 2. Cursor fixed it in version 3.0 (CVE-2026-50549, rated Critical). 3. Google shipped a fix for the affected build, 1.19.6. 4. Augment (0.754.3 tested) and Windsurf (V1.9566 tested) had not shipped a fix at the time of publication. 5. Anthropic rejected the report: "This falls outside our current threat model. When the user first starts Claude Code in a directory, they must confirm that they trust the directory prior to starting the session." That rejection moves the trust decision to session start, where the user cannot know what a later prompt will resolve to - and Claude Code is the clearest example in the research of the gap, because its own reasoning named the real target while the prompt shown to the developer did not. Wiz disputes the framing: trust granted to a directory should mean trust in what that directory contains, not consent to write outside it, and no approval UI should resolve an untrusted path without showing the resolved target. The pattern matters because the approval dialog is the control that most teams rely on when they let a coding agent edit files autonomously - the same dialog that reads as meaningful consent in every agent product's marketing. Source: https://www.wiz.io/blog/ghostapproval-a-trust-boundary-gap-in-ai-coding-assistants
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